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Abstract  
Trade policy in the European Union is characterized by an intensive use of Antidumping measures. In this paper 
we compare existing practices in the EU to WTO rules and to other WTO Members. Our comparative analysis 
reveals that the EU's "lesser-duty rule", which limits the magnitude of the Antidumping duty to the level of 
domestic injury caused by dumped imports, results in a lower average duty level in EU cases, particularly when 
compared to the US. In terms of the "Sunset Clause", which limits the duration of protection to 5 years, the EU 
presents a lower share of measures lasting beyond this limit as compared to other users of Antidumping. In 
recent years, the number of case initiations by the EU has decreased. There has also been a shift towards the 
imposition of duties and away from the use of price undertakings as a protectionist measure. In line with other 
WTO members, an increasing share of cases are targeted against China, where it used to be predominantly 
Central-European countries and Japan, as well as other low or middle income countries. 
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1. Introduction 
In  the  context  of  the  WTO  system,  Members  are  allowed  to  impose  unilateral  trade 
restrictions against other Members through three “contingent protection” instruments: Antidumping 
(AD),  Countervailing duties  (CVD)  and Safeguards (SG). The  first two are  aimed  at  counteracting 
actions  by  foreign  exporters  or  governments  that  are  considered  unfair  (dumping  or  subsidies). 
Unlike SG, AD and CVD are applied against particular trading partners and are therefore exceptions 
to  the  Most  Favoured  Nation  (MFN)  rule.SG  are  instruments  which  allow  Members  to  impose 
temporary trade restrictions in the face of unusual increases in imports, in order to help domestic 
producers to adjust to new situations.  
In its most basic form, dumping refers to a situation in which a foreign exporter sells its 
product in the export market at a lower price than in its own home market. AD measures are meant 
to  counteract  this  behaviour  that  is  implicitly  deemed  unfair.  However,  from  an  economic 
perspective dumping, thus defined, is price discrimination across borders, which is not necessarily 
unfair
1. An in-depth discussion of the merits of AD is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that AD is increasingly seen as a safety valve instrument giving authorities 
some  flexibility  to  act  in  circumstances  where  domestic  producers  face  unusually  strong  import 
competition. In this sense, rather than an instrument to protect domestic producers from unfair 
practices  by  foreign  firms,  AD  is  perceived  as  an  industrial  policy  tool  (Blonigen  &  Prusa,  2003, 
Konings & Vandenbussche, 2005).   
The aim of this chapter is to compare AD practices in the EU to WTO rules as well as 
practices in other WTO Members. We do this in two ways. Firstly, we compare AD rules in the EU to 
the  WTO’s  framework  as  well  as  rules  applied  by  other  WTO  Members,  and  analyse  their 
implications. In the second part, we present a descriptive statistical analysis of the use of AD in the 
EU to see how it applies AD rules and how this compares to other users
2. On the basis of these two 
analyses, we identify advantages and risks associated with the particular features of EU AD law and 
practice. 
2. Peculiarities of EU Antidumping rules and their implications 
In  the  WTO  system  AD  is  regulated  by  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  and  the  Anti-Dumping 
Agreement  (ADA).  Article  VI  allows  Members  to  impose  discriminatory  trade  restrictions  against 
another Member when a foreign exporter sells its product at less than its “normal value” (NV), and 
this  “dumping”  causes  or  threatens  to  cause  “material  injury”  to  the  domestic  industry.  In  the 
context of the EU, AD is regulated by Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union  and  the  Antidumping  Regulation  -  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  1225/2009.  EU  AD 
                                                              
1 An exception is “predatory pricing” where a firm sells its product at a price below costs in order to force other 
competitors out of the market and thus obtain a monopoly. However, the conditions necessary for successful 
predatory pricing are very unlikely to be met in most markets; in fact, studies have shown that almost all AD 
cases do not meet these conditions. See Shin (1998) and Bourgeois & Messerlin (1998). 
2 All AD data used in this paper comes from the World Bank’s Global Antidumping Database (GAD), (Bown, 
2010a) and WTO Notifications. 3 
 
investigations are carried out by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission by initiative of 
Community producers
3.  
The Commission first evaluates whether there is evidence of dumping by comparing the 
foreign firm’s export price (EP) to the EU against NV. The EP considered is the price “actually paid or 
payable  for  the  product  sold  for  export  to  the  [EU]  net  of  all  taxes,  discounts,...,  and  rebates” 
(Macrory et al., 1991) - the ex-factory price. NV is calculated as "the comparable price actually paid 
or payable in the ordinary course of trade for the like product intended for consumption in the 
exporting country or the country of origin” (Macrory, Vermulst & Waer, 1991). If the quantity of 
domestic sales is insufficient or the exporting country is considered a "nonmarket economy", NV can 
be calculated on the basis of the export price to a third country or on the basis of a "constructed 
value", computed as production costs plus a specified profit margin
4.  
Dumping margins (DM) are computed as the difference between NV and EP. In accordance 
with Article II of ADA, three alternative methods can be used in this price comparison: 1) weighted 
average NV to weighted average EP, 2) NV and EP on a transaction-to-transaction basis, and 3) in the 
special case where “a pattern of export prices...differ(s) significantly among different purchasers, 
regions  or  time  periods”
5  it  is  allowed  to  compare  a  weighted  average  NV  to  EPs  in  individual 
transitions. In the last two methods, a specific DM is calculated for each transaction, which is later 
averaged to obtain the overall DM.
6 
Once it has determined the presence of dumping, the Commission next evaluates whether 
dumping is causing or threatens to cause injury to European producers. This includes looking at the 
evolution of industry performance variables such as sales and employment as well as the extent to 
which EPs undercut prices charged by European Producers (injury margin). The Commission is also 
requested to verify whether measures would be against community interest, a topic we will return to 
below.  If  both  dumping  and  injury  are  found,  measures  are  imposed  by  the  Council  on 
recommendation by the Commission.  
In the remainder of this section, we analyse in more in detail five peculiarities of EU AD 
laws which are particularly relevant from the economic perspective, and discuss their implications in 
terms of the application of AD rules and their potential effects on market outcomes.  
                                                              
3 The Commission may also initiate investigations on its own initiative, however to our knowledge this has 
never happened. 
4 For further details on how normal value is calculated see (Macrory, Vermulst & Waer, 1991) 
5 Anti-Dumping Agreement Article II: 4.2. 
6A common practice when calculating these averages is so-called “zeroing” or “simple zeroing”, which consists 
on replacing negative DMs found in specific transactions with zeros. It is outside the scope of this chapter to 
discuss the problems associated with zeroing. We only mention that given the evident bias it introduces in the 
calculation of DMs, this practice has been the focus to strong criticism, becoming the “single most litigated 
subject in the history of the WTO”
  (Vermulst & Ikenson, 2007). For an in-depth discussion of zeroing see 
Vermulst (2009) and Prusa (2010). 4 
 
2.1. Community interest 
As mentioned above, to the two conditions required for the imposition of Antidumping 
measures according to Article VI of the GATT, EU legislation adds a third condition, namely that 
measures should not be against the “community interest”. In principle, this means that, unlike in 
other parts of the world where only the interests of import-competing producers are considered, in 
the EU AD rules warrant that the welfare of other parties should also be taken into account. In 
particular, this should include an evaluation of the likely effect on consumers as well as downstream 
industries  that  could  be  affected  by  the  protection  because  they  use  the  product  as  an  input. 
However, in practice it is not clear to what extent this clause is strictly applied. In fact, the Global 
Antidumping  database  (World  Bank)  reports  only  six  EU  cases  in  which  rejection  was  due  to 
Community interest.  Even  in  the  case of  underreporting,  this  small  number  is  suggestive of the 
limited use of the Community Interest clause in the EU. 
2.2. Cumulative analysis or “cumulation” 
Cumulation is a feature shared by many AD users, including the EU, the US, Canada and 
Australia. The importance of cumulation stems from the fact that usually simultaneous AD petitions 
are filed against different foreign exporters in the same product. Cumulation allows authorities to 
consider the combined effect of the aggregate imports from all sources under investigation in the 
evaluation of material injury. Despite the fact that this rule was not mentioned in the GATT/WTO, 
nor was it included in EU regulations prior to the Uruguay Round, it did appear to be common 
practice. For example, Tharakan, Greenaway & Tharakan (1998) report that cumulation was used in 
91% of all multiple-country cases filed in the EU between 1980 and 1987. However, unlike the US 
where cumulation has been mandatory since 1984 (Hansen & Prusa, 1996), in the EU it is at the 
discretion of the authorities to evaluate whether “a cumulative assessment of the effects of the 
imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition...”
7 
Defenders of cumulation argue that several smaller foreign exporters can cause the same 
degree of injury as a single larger one. Nevertheless, the practice is not without its critics. One major 
problem is that it increases the chance of affirmative rulings, especially against countries with small 
import  shares (Hansen & Prusa, 1996).  For the case of the EU,  Tharakan et  al.  (1998)  find  that 
cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury finding by about 42%. Moreover, they 
conclude that that around 36% of the cases included in their study in which cumulation was used 
would  have  resulted  in  a  negative  ruling  if  cumulation  had  not  been  used.  Furthermore,  these 
authors find that cumulation has a “super-additive” effect
8: the probability of an affirmative injury 
decision rises as the number of countries being cumulated increases, even holding the total import 
share constant.  
2.3. Lesser duty rule 
In  contrast  with  other  AD  users  such  as  the  US  and  Canada,  EU  AD  duties  do  not 
necessarily have to match the entire DM if a lower duty is sufficient to eliminate the material injury 
                                                              
7 Antidumping Regulation - Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009, Article III: 4.b. 
8 Hansen & Prusa (1996) were the first to notice this phenomenon in the US. 5 
 
to the domestic industry. This “lesser duty rule” should result in a lower level of duties overall. To 
illustrate this, Fig.1 compares average AD duty levels in the EU to those in US and Canada between 
1989 and 2009
9. In almost every year, average AD duty levels in the EU are much lower than in the 
US. Compared to Canada, they are around the same levels at the beginning of the period considered, 
but are also lower towards the end. In fact, the US and Canada’s duty levels show an increasing 
tendency, not present in the EU. The overall average duty level in the EU for the entire period is 30%, 
against 70% for the US and 47% for Canada. Moreover, the maximum duty level registered in the EU 
was 96.8% imposed in two cases against Japan in 1994 and 2000. For the US the maximum was 386% 
and in Canada 226%, both imposed against Chinese firms in 2009 and 2007 respectively. Although 
other phenomena may explain these differences, the numbers are at least suggestive and seem to 
indicate that the lesser duty rule is effective at keeping AD duty levels low. 
 
[INSERT Figure 1] 
 
The desirability of having lower duty levels rests on the premise that they lead to fewer 
distortions to market competition. However, lesser duty rules may have hidden effects. In fact, one 
of the peculiar features of AD policies is that their mere filing can affect firms’ behaviour since the 
result of the investigation depends on market outcomes. From this perspective, a study by Pauwels, 
Vandenbussche & Weverbergh (2001) is particularly relevant. In their theoretical model, a domestic 
firm has the incentive to expand its quantity sold during the investigation period in order to increase 
the  calculated  DM.  However,  under a lesser duty  rule, this  is  offset  by  an incentive  to  contract 
quantities in order to increase the injury margin. Which of the two dominates will depend on the 
firms’  expectation  regarding  which  margin  will  finally  be  applied.  The  authors  show  than  under 
certain circumstances, a lesser duty system leads to lower overall welfare than a pure dumping-
margin system. Also, overall domestic output is higher under the pure dumping-margin system than 
under  a  lesser  duty  rule.  Although  this  may  not  be  the  case  in  all  circumstances,  their  model 
highlights the fact that given the endogeneity of AD duties, their effects go beyond that of a simple 
duty.  Peculiar  features  of  the  rules, that  may  at  first  light  look  innocent, may have unexpected 
effects. In this particular case, results suggest that although it is desirable to have a mechanism 
assuring lower duty levels, it will be preferable that such a mechanism is not open to manipulation by 
firms. 
2.4. Treatment of non-named and potential exporters 
AD investigations are directed at particular firms from the targeted country. For each of 
these firms a separate DM is calculated and if the case is affirmative, a firm specific duty is imposed. 
However, imports from other firms in the same country are also subject to a duty, even if those firms 
have not committed “dumping”. In the EU, this duty is the highest duty of among those imposed to 
firms named in the investigation - in the US is the weighted average of duties imposed to named 
firms (Macrory, Vermulst & Waer, 1991). 
                                                              
9 To simplify the comparison, we only consider ad valorem duties, as it will be shown later, in the EU the vast 
majority of duties take this form, while in the US and Canada all AD duties are ad valorem. 6 
 
In order to avoid circumvention of duties, the same criterion usually applies to newcomers 
that were not active in the EU market during the AD investigation (Macrory, Vermulst & Waer, 1991). 
The  main  problem  with  this  provision  is  that  it  increases  barriers  to  entry  in  the  EU  market, 
increasing the market power of incumbents (Stegemann, 1990). This can be particularly problematic 
if combined with price undertakings (PUs), where named firms agree to maintain a minimum price 
and thus avoid paying duties. Not only do ADmeasures in the EU allow prices to be set at a higher 
level, but they also eliminate the competition from potential new entrants.  
2.5. Single agency system 
Unlike other WTO Members (such as the US where two separate agencies are involved), in 
the EU both the dumping and injury investigations are concentrated in the European Commission. 
Arguably, having two independent agencies goes in favour of objectivity (Blonigen & Prusa, 2003). 
Conversely, a unified system has the advantage of avoiding conflicting judgements. For example, in a 
two  agency  system,  the  agency  in  charge  of  the  dumping  decision  may  define  the  products 
concerned narrowly as to maximize the duty, while the other may do it broadly in order to maximize 
injury (Blonigen & Prusa, 2003).  Yet, it is unclear how relevant this is in practice. In fact, according to 
our  calculations  using  data  from  the  Global  Antidumping  Database  (World  Bank),  95%  of  cases 
initiated  between  1989  and  2008  in  the  US  where  a  dumping  decision  was  made,  received  an 
affirmative dumping ruling. In contrast, the share of affirmative rulings on total injury decisions was 
62%. This suggests that the fate of an AD petition is really decided in the injury stage. In the EU, the 
share of affirmative rulings in total dumping and injury decisions was 77% and 74%, respectively. 
Additionally, a single agency system should in theory be more susceptible to political influences than 
two agency system (Macrory, Vermulst & Waer, 1991). However, an empirical study by Tharakan & 
Waelbroeck (1994) failed to find notable differences between the two systems.  
What  the  evidence  seems  to  suggest  is  that  even  when  two  separate  agencies  are 
involved, the power to decide who gets protection is nonetheless concentrated in one. This makes 
the distinction between the two systems less relevant than what a priori one may think. What seems 
to be important is what concerns the injury decision. It is there that authorities have more discretion 
and are therefore more vulnerable to political pressure. In this sense, the lower share of rejections 
on total injury decisions registered the EU with respect to the US is of some concern. 
3. Antidumping activity in the EU 
In this section we analyse the use of AD by the EU and compare it to that of other selected 
users as well as worldwide trends. We use data from the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) from 
the World Bank (Bown, 2010a) and WTO Antidumping Notifications. We focus particularly on the 
period 1995 to 2008, although we extend this period when data availability allows it. This period is 
particularly interesting for at least two reasons. Firstly, it covers the years post-Uruguay Round when 
important changes to AD rules were introduced. In particular, since 1995 Members are obliged to 
notify the WTO when AD cases are initiated or measures imposed. Additionally, focusing on AD 
activity after 1995 allows us to compare the use of AD in the EU not only with respect to traditional 
users  but  also  to  countries  that  have  started  using  AD  in  later  years,  in  particular  emerging 
economies. We analyse the use of AD by the EU and other users in several manners. We first focus 
on the intensity of AD activity both in terms of initiations and measures, we then look at what are the 7 
 
outcomes of these initiations and in particular the type of measures applied and their length. We 
then examine which countries are targeted and how this relates to outcomes and measures, and 
finally we look at AD activity across industries.   
3.2. The use of Antidumping 
How  intensively  does  the  EU  use  AD?
10    According  to  WTO  Antidumping  Notifications 
between 1995 and 2010 (table 1), the EU ranks third both in terms of initiations and measures, only 
preceded by India and the US. Fig. 2 presents the evolution of the number of AD initiations and 
measures by year of initiation. We divide the 15 year period 1995 to 2009 into five sub-periods and 
present data for the top 4 heaviest users to which we add China and worldwide WTO Notification. 
Unlike the EU and US which are traditional users of AD, the other three countries considered did not 
use AD intensively until the 1990s
11. The evolution of AD activity was somewhat varied across users. 
In the EU, the number of initiations tended to decrease from a total of a 100 cases in the first period 
to 41 in the latest. The share of measures on total initiations, on the other hand, does not present 
significant changes. Both the US and India experienced a sharp peak in the use of AD in between 
1998 and 2003, followed by a pronounced drop in the period starting in 2004. China presents a much 
reduced number of cases in the first period given that it started using AD only in 1997. However, it 
later experienced a considerable increase in AD activity. Overall, worldwide AD activity
12 presented a 
peak in the second and third sub-periods, particularly driven by the sharp increases in the US and 
India,  with  a  later  drop  to  levels  similar  to  those  of  the  first  sub-period.  Another  element  that 
emerges from Fig. 2 is that new users present a higher share of cases ending in measures than 
traditional users, an issue we discuss further in what follows. 
 
[INSERT Figure 2] 
 
What are the outcomes of AD petitions? Fig. 3 presents the desegregation of AD cases filed 
in these five users according to whether they resulted in measures, were withdrawn by petitioners or 
were terminated by the authorities. The EU presents a slightly higher share of cases resulting in 
measures than the US, but much lower than the three new users considered. In fact, these countries 
present a particularly large share of cases resulting in measures, especially India and China where this 
ratio is around 80%. Regarding terminations, only a quarter of cases are terminated in the EU, much 
lower  than  the  41%  in  the  US.  The  difference  is  partly  explained  by  a  much  higher  share  of 
withdrawals, 16%. In fact, this seems to be a peculiarity of the EU compared to the other four users. 
 
[INSERT Figure 3] 
 
                                                              
10 For a more sophisticated analysis see Bown (2010b) and Vandenbussche & Viegelahn (2011). 
11Although Argentina had an AD law since 1972, the number of AD measures was limited until mid-1990s 
(Nogues & Baracat, 2005). India and China had their first AD cases in 1992 and 1997 respectively (GAD). 
12 Although WTO Notifications only include AD activity by WTO Members, this represents the vast majority of 
worldwide use of AD. 8 
 
It is interesting to see whether this result is driven by a new trend towards withdrawals or 
if it has always been the case. This is considered in the lower part of Fig. 3. Although there is some 
variation in the share of withdrawals, it has always been above 12%. Therefore, it seems that this is a 
characteristic of EU AD and it has been so for a long time. The economic literature has put forward 
evidence suggesting that many withdrawals may be the result of unofficial agreements between 
domestic and foreign firms leading to quantity restrictions and higher prices. In particular, Prusa 
(1992) and Zanardi (2004) present economic models where domestic firms strategically file for AD 
protection in order to induce foreign firms into such agreements; once this objective is achieved, the 
case is withdrawn. Zanardi (2004) tests this empirically using US data and finds evidence supporting 
the  hypothesis
13.  In  light  of  these  findings,  the  greater  share  of  withdrawals  in  EU  decisions  is 
somewhat worrying, since it may be a symptom of AD being used more intensively as a collusive 
device between competitors.  
3.2. The characteristics of Antidumping measures 
What types of measures are applied? Although usually we think of AD measures as duties, 
they are not the only option available to authorities. In fact, AD regimes usually include provisions 
allowing authorities to suspend the imposition of duties if foreign firms agree to charge minimum 
prices or to restrict exports in order to eliminate dumping and injury. In the EU, such agreements are 
known as price or quantity undertakings. Fig. 4 presents the disaggregation of AD measures by type 
of measure. For duties, we indicate whether they are ad valorem or specific. As it is the case for most 
users, the vast majority of AD measures in the EU are in the form of a duty, with a preference for ad 
valorem duties to specific ones. Also, there is a greater relative use of price undertakings (PUs) in the 
EU, with the exception of Argentina where most cases result in a combination of duties and PUs 
(DPUs). 
[INSERT figure 4] 
 
The lower part of Fig. 4 presents the desegregation of EU AD measures since 1989. The 
graph gives a clear message: the use of PUs in the EU has decreased steadily in favour of duties. In 
fact, in the last 5-year period there were no petitions resulting in pure PUs. Although they have been 
partially  substituted  by  DPUs,  it  is  clear  that  the  relative  use  of  duties  is  increasingly  preferred 
representing more than 80% of measures in the last sub-period.  
This tendency has been  reported before  in  the  literature.  If  fact,  Pauwels  &  Springael 
(2002) report that most AD measures in the EU took the form of price-undertakings until 1987, in 
which year this trend was reversed in favour of duties. One possible reading of this finding is that the 
European Commission is taking a more protectionist position in terms of its use of AD. However, as 
argued  by  Vandenbussche  (1995).,  this  may  be  in  fact  related  to  a  shift  in  the  countries  being 
targeted by AD petitions. We will come back to this shortly. For now let us recall that the overall 
share of measures with respect to petitions has stayed more or less stable through time. Therefore, 
the decreasing use of PUs seems to reflect not a change towards more protection but rather a choice 
among types of instruments. The economic literature has put forward several arguments suggesting 
that favouring simple tariffs over PUs may not be such a bad idea. 
                                                              
13 However, Taylor (2004) does not find support for the collusion hypothesis. 9 
 
PUs are particularly attractive to foreign exporters since they allow them to capture rents 
that  under  a  duty  will  stay  in  the  EU.  They  may  also  provide  more  market  access  than  duties, 
especially if these are prohibitively high (Mastel, 1998). This implies that in certain circumstance price 
or  quantity  undertakings  may  actually  be  preferable  to  free  trade  for  foreign  firms.  Moreover, 
Anderson (1993, 1992) argues that agreements such as PUs may give rise to what he calls “domino 
dumping”,  a  situation  in which  foreign producers  seeking the quota  rents  associated with  these 
agreements may dump in order to provoke the initiation of an AD case.  
The advantages for European authorities are less evident. A PU equivalent to a given level 
of  duty,  i.e.  a  price  for  the  foreign  product  that  will  result  in  the  same  level  of  prices  and 
consumption in the EU market, will imply a lower level of total welfare for the EU given the loss of 
tariff  revenue  (Pauwels  &  Springael,  2002).  Moreover,  although  in  static  terms  duties  and 
undertakings  may  be  equivalent  to  domestic  producers  and  consumers,  PUs  may  disadvantage 
European producers through quality reversals, as shown by Vandenbussche & Wauthy (2001). It has 
been argued that one possible reason behind the use of PUs lies in the fact that they are less likely to 
result in retaliation, however empirical evidence does not seem to support this argument (1991)..  
 The  discussion  above  seems  to  suggest  that  PUs  should  not  be  allowed  under  AD. 
However, if PUs were not in place, there is a risk that they be substituted by unofficial agreements 
leading  to  withdrawals,  with  similar  anticompetitive  effects.  Of  course,  duties  also  have 
anticompetitive effects. The main message emerging from the literature is the need for coordination 
between AD and Antitrust policies given the potential anticompetitive effects of AD. This issue seems 
particularly relevant for the EU given the greater share of withdrawals and PUs, which as discussed 
are symptomatic of more anticompetitive intensions in foreign and domestic firms. 
 
How long do measures last? One of the major  changes in AD rules introduced by the 
Uruguay Round was to limit the duration of measures to a maximum of five years, after which they 
have to be revised (Sunset Reviews)
14. To illustrate the extent to which this limits the duration of AD 
measures,  table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  on  length  of  measures  for  the  five  users 
considered
15. We exclude the last three years of the sample since measures imposed in those years 
are still, at the time of writing of this chapter, within the 5 year limit imposed by the WTO. 
 
[INSERT tables 1 and 2] 
 
On  average  an  AD  measure  in  the  EU  lasts  for  74  months,  much  lower  than  average 
duration  in  the  US,  100  months,  but  slightly  higher  than  in  the  other  three  users  considered. 
Argentina presents particularly low average duration due to the fact that in this country AD measures 
are set to last for 3 years instead of 5. The fifth column presents the number of measures that ended 
precisely 5 years (60 months) after their imposition and column six the number of those that lasted 
longer. In the EU a third of measures are revoked respecting exactly that limit, a much higher share 
                                                              
14 However, unlike other user like the US, the EU already had mechanism of obligatory revision of measures 
pervious to the Uruguay Round amendments. 
15 The descriptive analysis of duration of measures presented here is inspired by what is presented in Cadot 
(2007). We remit the reader to this paper for a more in depth analysis of this issue. 10 
 
as compared to other users. This is probably due to the fact that in the EU AD measures expire 
automatically after 5 years except if a revision is initiated. As for those extending the limit, the EU 
presents a smaller share than the US but similar to the other users. These statistics include measures 
that are still in force today, for which we calculated duration until December 2010, the last period for 
which information on revocation is available. Measures following under this category are quantified 
in column 7. With respect to the different type of measure (not presented in the table), we did not 
find remarkable differences in the length of measures according to their type, except for DPUs which 
present lower average duration than pure duties across users. 
Fig. 5 presents the evolution of measure length for the EU and the US since 1990. We 
represent duration both for the entire sample of measures and the sub-sample excluding measures 
still in force. The figure shows a clear decreasing tendency for both users. However, the US registers 
higher average duration throughout the period. Up to 1995 this could be explained by the fact that 
the EU had 5-year reviews in place while the US did not, yet the length of measures is persistently 
higher in the US. Also, the distance between the solid (all measures) and dotted lines (excluding 
measures  still  in  force)  is  much  lower  for  the  EU,  which  indicates  that  the US  has  in  place  old 
measures to a larger extent than the EU. 
[INSERT Figure 5] 
3.3. The targeted countries 
Which  countries  are  more  frequently  targeted?  Table  3  presents  the  disaggregation  of 
initiations in the EU and WTO Notifications by targeted country. China is by far the country most 
targeted both by the EU and worldwide, followed by other Asian countries, especially South Korea, 
India and Taiwan. In fact, there is a clear concentration of cases on Asian countries with the five most 
targeted  countries  by  the EU  all in this region. Except  for South  Korea, the EU  seems to target 
relatively less high income countries as compared to worldwide tendencies.  
 
[INSERT table 3] 
 
Figure 6 compares the EU AD initiations by group of targeted country to initiations by the 
other  users  considered  (we  single  out  China  as  separate  target  group). All users  present similar 
shares to worldwide WTO Notifications, with the exception of China. In particular, the concentration 
of cases against China is present in all users. The EU presents a higher share of cases against new EU 
Member States than other users, something not surprising given the progressive elimination of other 
trade barriers in the process leading to EU accession. As a user, China presents a radically different 
profile to others, with more than a quarter of all AD initiations directed at high income countries 
(16% targeted at EU15 and the remainder mostly at Japan, South Korea and the US, China’s three 
most targeted countries). 
[INSERT figure 6] 
 
We next analyse how the number of initiations and measures against different targets has 
evolved through time in the EU as compared to worldwide tendencies. We present this information 
in Fig. 7. It is important to bear in mind that WTO Notifications in the second and third sub-periods 
are inflated by the peak in AD activity registered for the US and India, as shown in Fig. 2. There is an 
increasing concentration of cases against China. In particular, this concentration seems to concern 11 
 
only China and not other developing countries, at least in the EU where the number of cases against 
this group decreased progressively through the period. Finally, in both panels high income countries 
seem to be losing importance as targets, most notably EU Member States. This is not only related to 
the vanishing of EU AD cases against new Members States as they join the Union, but also to a 
decrease in the number of initiations against all EU Members States by other users. 
 
[INSERT figure 7] 
 
Are certain outcomes more likely depending on which country is targeted? Fig. 8 presents 
the disaggregation of AD cases in the EU by outcome and targeted country, splitting the period 
between 1989 and 2008 into two 10-year sub-periods. Shares seem to differ greatly depending on 
which country is targeted. Cases against new EU Member States are much more likely to end in PUs 
than for the other groups, especially in the first sub-period. In fact, this has been reported before in 
the  literature  and  it  explains  at  least  partially  why  PUs  are  becoming  more  infrequent 
(Vandenbussche, 1995). The opposite is true for China, where duties are preferred. Also, the rate of 
rejection is smaller for initiations against this country, a characteristic not shared by cases against 
other developing countries. For other middle and low income countries, the most remarkable change 
is a shift to more duties and less PUs. In general terms, it seems that the overall tendency discussed 
above towards more duties and less PUs is mostly drawn by the growing importance of China as a 
target and the vanishing of AD cases against new EU Member States after accession. 
 
[INSERT figure 8] 
 
3.4. The sectors involved 
Are some industries more likely to request and obtain AD protection? Fig. 9 presents the 
desegregation of worldwide and EU AD initiations and measures by sector. The EU presents similar 
industry shares as compared to worldwide WTO notifications. There is a great concentration of AD 
activity in just a handful of industries. In fact, almost 80% of cases and measures worldwide involve 
the top 5 industries. Moreover, two industries, metals and chemicals, concentrate half of all AD 
activity. The lower panel presents the evolution of initiations and measures by sector in the EU. The 
graph shows an increasing concentration of cases in metal industries. This is not so much due to an 
increase in the number of petitions in this sector, but to a decrease in petitions in other industries, 
especially towards the end of the sample and in textiles and machinery.  
 
[INSERT figure 9] 
 
There are small differences in the share of different sectors on initiations and measures in 
the EU. In particular, metals and chemicals present a greater share of measures than of initiations, 
which suggest these industries are more successful than others at obtaining protection. To explore 
this further Fig. 10 presents the desegregation of EU AD initiations by industry and outcome. There 
are  important  differences  across  industries.  For  metals  and  chemicals  more  than  70%  of  all  AD 
petitions result in protection. Even more successful are plastics with almost 80% of all petitions 
resulting in measures. At the other extreme are machinery and textiles where a much greater share 12 
 
of  petitions  are  rejected,  40%  and  48%  respectively.  Withdrawals  are  rather  common  across  all 
industries, with the exception of plastics. As for the type of measures applied, PUs are particularly 
common in metal industries and plastics, while chemicals present a higher degree of duties. 
 
[INSERT figure 10] 
 
Finally,  we  also  verify  whether  sectors  from  particular  countries  are  more  frequently 
targeted (Fig. 11). Sector rankings are more or less stable across country groups; however, there are 
certain peculiarities. Petitions targeted against new EU Member States present a particularly high 
concentration on metals and to a lesser extent on chemicals. As for AD cases against high income 
countries, they concentrate more on machinery and electronics as compared to petitions in other 
sectors. We also went a bit further and explored whether sectors from specific countries within each 
group were more frequently targeted. We found that the sector-country pair where more AD activity 
is present is metals from China (representing 6% of overall initiations and 10% of measures), followed 
by chemicals from China (5 and 6% respectively), metals from Russia (3 and 4%), electronics from 
China (3% in both) and textiles from India (2% in both).  
 
[INSERT figure 11] 
3. Conclusions 
The analysis presented in this chapter shows no evidence of contradictions between the 
application of AD in the EU and the WTO general framework. Moreover, the EU has mechanisms in 
place that should allow it to keep AD protection levels under control. The presence of a lesser duty 
rule appears to successfully prevent the imposition of excessively high duties and results in lower 
average duty levels overall. Furthermore, the EU appears to respect to a large extent the limit on 
duration imposed by Sunset Reviews, although around 44% of measures are extended beyond that 
boundary. Still, it presents much lower average durations than US, although similar or higher than 
new users. It also has a mechanism to introduce the interests of other parties, such as consumers, in 
the decision on whether to grant protection through the community interest clause. However, there 
is not a great deal of evidence suggesting that this provision really limits the imposition of measures; 
on  the  contrary,  the  EU  presents  particularly  high  levels  of  affirmative  injury  determinations, 
especially compared to the US. Also, the use of cumulation, which is not peculiar to the EU, is found 
to greatly increase the probability of obtaining affirmative injury rulings. Furthermore, the fact of 
having  a  single  agency  system  could  imply  less  objectivity  and  more  vulnerability  to  political 
pressures. This could explain the lower degree of rejection of AD petitions in the EU compared to the 
US.  However,  the  evidence  indicates  that  the  difference  does  not  stem  from  this  institutional 
separation but rather on the way injury decisions are carried out.  
With respect to the intensity in the use of AD, although it is still one of main users of the 
instrument, the number of cases and measures in the EU has decreased in recent years, with the 
exception of those against China and involving metal industries. There has also been a shift in the 
type of measures applied, towards more duties and less PUs, although this seems to be a result of 
the increasing share of cases against China and the disappearance of cases against new EU Member 
States. Still the EU presents both a higher share of withdrawals and PUs as compared to other AD 13 
 
users. In terms of targets, the EU follows the worldwide tendency to concentrate cases and measures 
on China and other Asian countries. The EU also follows worldwide tendency in terms of industries, 
concentrating most cases in metal and chemicals, and to a lesser extent electronics, textiles and 
plastics. 
Probably  the  most  critical  concern  regarding  AD  policy  is  its  potential  anticompetitive 
effects, especially the fact that it can be abused by firms in order to bring about price collusion in 
domestic markets. Although we do not test this empirically here, the EU presents some worrying 
symptoms that point in this direction. In particular, the greater share of withdrawn cases compared 
to other AD users may be an indication that firms are applying for AD protection in order to force 
competitors to keep prices at higher levels. In this sense, a coordination of AD and Antitrust policies 
seems essential. The EU is particularly well placed to do so given its institutional structure, where 
both policies are carried out by two directorates within the same authority. A stricter interpretation 
of the common interest clause would not only make this possible but unavoidable. 
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Table 1: Top 10 users of Antidumping in terms of number of initiations and measures, 
January 1995 – June 2010. 
 
 
Initiations 
   
Measures 
 
1)  India  613  1)  India  436 
2)  United States  442  2)  United States  289 
3)  European Union  414  3)  European Union  269 
4)  Argentina  277  4)  Argentina  190 
5)  Australia  212  5)  Turkey  142 
6)  South Africa  212  6)  China  137 
7)  Brazil  184  7)  South Africa  128 
8)  China  182  8)  Brazil  105 
9)  Canada  152  9)  Canada  94 
10)  Turkey  145  10)  Mexico  83 
Source: WTO Antidumping Notifications 
 
 
Table 2: Duration in months of Antidumping measures imposed, 1995 - 2005. 
  
Imposing 
country  Obs.  Mean  St. Dv. 
Exactly 60 
months 
More than 60 
months  In force§ 
EU  207  74  34  76 (37%)  91 (44%)  56 (27%) 
US  208  100  39  43 (21%)  157 (75%)  135 (65%) 
India  274  67  29  10 (4%)  134 (49%)  88 (32%) 
Argentina  100  59  35  6 (6%)  39 (39%)  41 (41%) 
China  76  73  24  14 (18%)  51 (67%)  46 (61%) 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Global Antidumping Database (World Bank). 
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Table 3: Antidumping initiations by targeted country, cases initiated 1995 - 2009. 
 
  EU initiations  Worldwide WTO Notifications 
Targeted country  # cases  Share in total  Rank  # cases  Share in total  Rank 
New EU Member States             
Poland  9  2%  12  29  1%  26 
Czech Republic  7  2%  14  19  1%  36 
Other  <6  < 1,5%  > 16  <37  < 1%  >22 
Total group  42  10%    147  4%   
             
Other high income countries             
Korea, Republic of  28  7%  3  264  7%  2 
Chinese Taipei (Taiwan)  22  5%  4  198  5%  4 
United States  13  3%  8  205  6%  3 
Japan  9  2%  12  155  4%  6 
EU15 Member States        467  13%  12 - 68 
Other  4 or <  < 1%  > 20  30 or <  < 1%  19 or > 
Total group  93  23%    1509  41%   
             
Middle/low income countries             
China  90  22%  1  761  21%  1 
India  29  7%  2  145  4%  8 
Thailand  20  5%  5  150  4%  7 
Russian Federation  19  5%  6  119  3%  9 
Malaysia  16  4%  7  98  3%  11 
Ukraine  13  3%  8  63  2%  14 
Indonesia  12  3%  10  156  4%  5 
Turkey  12  3%  10  46  1%  18 
Brazil  4  1%  21  108  3%  10 
Other  < 8  < 2%  > 13  < 30  < 2%  > 14 
Total group  266  66%    2027  55%   
Source: Own calculations using data from the Global Antidumping Database (World Bank) and WTO Antidumping Notifications. 
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Figure 1: Average Antidumping ad valorem duty levels by year of imposition. 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Antidumping initiations and measures 1995 – 2009. 
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Figure 3: Antidumping investigations by outcome, cases initiated 1995 – 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Antidumping measures by type, cases initiated 1995 – 2008. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the average duration (in months) of Antidumping measures. 
 
Figure 6: Antidumping initiations by targeted countries, cases initiated 1995 – 2009. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of the number of Antidumping initiations and measures in the EU 
and worldwide by targeted country. 
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Figure 8: Outcomes of EU Antidumping initiations by targeted country. 
 
 
Figure 9: Antidumping initiations and measures by sector. 
 
 22 
 
Figure 10: EU Antidumping initiations by sector and outcome 1995 – 2008. 
 
 
Figure 11: EU Antidumping initiations and measures by sector and targeted countries, 
cases initiated 1995 – 2009. ISSN 1379-244X D/2011/3082/023